



EU WATCH

PUBLIC REPORT — APRIL, 2026

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# French MEP Rima Hassan :

# Why the European Parliament is not reacting ?

Institutional silence as central anomaly

INSTITUTIONAL REPORT

LEGAL FRAMEWORK & RADICALIZED COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTS

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30 seconds to understand

This full report documents 21 publicly available material facts and 7 active criminal proceedings in France concerning MEP Rima Hassan.

A video sequence exceeding 15 million views on her X (formerly Twitter) account marks a concrete turning point in the case.

Several judicial deadlines are concentrated in 2026, including: A hearing on July 7 Two summonses on September 16.

The case also reflects an international signal: Canada and Israel, two democratic allies of the European Union, have banned Rima Hassan from entering their territories.

The European Parliament has already demonstrated, in the Braun precedent, that it can act when facts are considered detachable from the parliamentary mandate. .

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Samuel Madar  
**EXECUTIVE  
DIRECTOR  
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## Executive introduction

This report examines the case of MEP Rima Hassan based on a set of public facts, documented positions, and ongoing legal proceedings at national level. It relies on publicly available elements of different nature (statements, widely circulated digital sequences, and judicial procedures), whose convergence, coherence, and timing give them particular significance.

The purpose of this work is neither to provide a political interpretation nor to replace judicial authorities. It does not seek to establish guilt. It aims to rigorously analyze the reaction (or lack thereof) of an institution in response to documented public elements.

Several key events structure this analysis:

- a digital sequence reaching over 15 million views followed by violent acts targeting identifiable third parties,
- judicial proceedings now concentrated over a defined period,
- internal alerts formally submitted within the European Parliament itself.

The question is therefore not only about the facts, but about the point at which the European Parliament reacts.... or chooses not to react.



Rima Hassan  
**FRENCH MEMBER OF  
THE EUROPEAN**

## SUBJECT PROFILE

Who is the person concerned ?

**Status** Serving MEP (The Left – LFI), central subject of this report.

**Period analyzed** 2024–2026, from accumulation of public facts to

## PARLIAMENT

procedural  
escalation.

### Referenced environment

The file notably mentions Hicham Touili-Idrissi, presented in public sources as a parliamentary assistant and member of the Palestine committee at Sciences Po.

### Main documented allegations

Legitimation of armed violence, statements relating to terrorism, mobilization targetting third parties, ORPI sequence and active judicial proceedings

### Institutional signal

Official reprimand by the European Parliament on March 10, 2026 for an accessory issue, alongside a significantly broader unresolved case.

This document is not intended to judge a person. It provides the reader with information on the subject's institutional identity, the period examined, the environment mentioned in the file, and the nature of the questions raised by the report.

## 1. Introduction

European Union WATCH (EU WATCH) is a European non-governmental organization that documents, using a rigorous legal methodology, possible discrepancies between:

- the founding values of the Union,

- obligations attached to parliamentary mandate,
- and the actual institutional responses provided.

This report does not replace judicial authorities. It is based exclusively on public and verifiable sources.

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**Public facts are accumulating. Their scale is significant.  
No identifiable institutional response corresponds to  
them.**

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## Methodology

**Scope.** The report covers the period 2024–2026 and draws exclusively on publicly available information: statements, publications, digital records, institutional alerts, publicly accessible documents and procedural steps that have been made public. It does not claim to be exhaustive in every respect, nor does it seek to establish a judicial truth.

**Sources.** The information included is drawn from open, verifiable and archivable sources: public publications, institutional documents, decisions, accessible records, press articles and digital content. Each key fact is selected based on the principles of cross-checking and verifiability..

**Selection criteria.** Priority is given to facts of particular relevance in terms of their gravity, frequency, public impact, observable effects or institutional implications.

**Standard of proof.** A fact is considered established if it can be objectively linked to an identifiable public source. The analysis organises these facts chronologically and coherently. The institutional interpretation, however, remains a reasoned assessment based on the available evidence.

**Framework for analysis.** The report is structured across three complementary levels: the verifiable facts, the analysis of their chronological sequence, and the institutional implications that may result for the European Parliament.

**Limitations.** The report does not make legal assessments of the facts in place of the competent authorities, does not assert any causal link where this has

not been legally established, and proceeds.

## 2. Accumulation of facts

The complete corpus documents 21 material facts, 7 ongoing criminal proceedings under French law, more than 50 elected representatives supporting a call for an internal inquiry, as well as a cumulative online audience of nearly 2 million people.

The main table below presents a selection of key facts; further details are provided in the appendices. Each fact included in the main corpus is corroborated by at least two independent public sources. These are no longer isolated incidents.

A pattern is emerging and becoming traceable over time.

Date	Documented incident	Institutional scope
10 may 2024	Participation in the Maghreb-Mashreq Forum in Tunis, a political conference attended by representatives of Hamas, the PFLP and Islamic Jihad, amongst others.	The case moves beyond an isolated incident and becomes part of a series of public events incompatible with the standard of prudence expected of a Member of the European Parliament.
16 august 2024	Participation in a pro-Hamas rally in Jordan in tribute to Ismail Haniyeh, political leader of Hamas.	This incident marks an initial institutional warning sign: followed by a letter from French MEPs to Roberta Metsola and a request for a parliamentary inquiry submitted in August 2024 by Belgian MEP Assita Kanko. No response.
22 august 2024	Public refusal to describe the attacks of 7 October 2023 as terrorist acts.	A discrepancy emerges between public statements and the official political framework adopted by the European Union.
17 oct. 2024	Statement presenting armed resistance as "legitimate and indispensable."	The case reaches a critical threshold in discourse by documenting an explicit legitimisation of armed violence.

Date	Documented incident	Institutional scope
18 dec. 2024	Call stating that all Franco-Palestinians must be able to join the Palestinian armed resistance	The issue is no longer merely one of opinion, but a public call that may conflict with the criminal and institutional framework.
27 fév. 2025	Statement asserting that Hamas is conducting a legitimate action from the perspective of international Law.	The case takes on a clearer national dimension with a referral to the public prosecutor by French Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau.
17 march 2025	Digital targeting of Prisca Thevenot, French MP, followed by death threats against her from third parties.	The shift from discourse to tangible effects on third parties becomes more concrete and visible.
27 june 2025	ORPI video exposing identifiable employees to an audience of over 15 million views; two arson attacks follow in the days after.	This sequence marks the turning point of the report: the risk becomes visible, public and institutionally difficult to ignore.
10 sept. 2025	Call for a blockade of Eurolinks in Marseille, a structure targeted as identified in the dossier.	The dossier documents a logic of direct mobilisation beyond mere declarative discourse.
20 mars 2026	Statement claiming that hating Israel is a sign of "good mental health and militancy."	The polarisation of the discursive register intensifies even as judicial proceedings accelerate.

### 3. The judicial process

The judicial process now sets the pace for the case, marking the transition from a mere controversy to a criminal charge.

The timeline is structured around several key dates.

Following an initial participation in the Maghreb-Mashreq Forum in Tunis on 10 May 2024, a political conference attended notably by representatives of Hamas, the PFLP and Islamic Jihad, the case entered a first phase of institutional visibility in the summer of 2024.

Rima Hassan's attendance, on 16 August 2024, at a pro-Hamas rally in Jordan in tribute to Ismail Haniyeh was followed by two explicit political initiatives within the European Parliament: a letter from French MEPs addressed on 26 August 2024 to its President Roberta Metsola, now included as an annex to this report, and a request to open a parliamentary inquiry made in August 2024 by the Belgian MEP Assita Kanko.

It reached a major milestone in terms of visibility on 27 June 2025 with the events relating to the ORPI agency.

On an institutional and judicial level, the year 2026 marked a clear acceleration: a European reprimand, i.e. a disciplinary sanction by the Parliament, on 10 March, followed by a Canadian diplomatic expulsion, a measure taken by the Canadian authorities on 27 March, leading to police custody and questioning by the BRDP, the Brigade for the Suppression of Offences against the Person, on 2 and 3 April 2026. From that point onwards, the case no longer concerned merely the circulation of remarks, but a specific judicial process.

#### **An additional objective element comes into play :**

The procedural sequence is no longer limited to scattered reports.

It has intensified over time: an initial summons to Paris is noted as early as 30 April 2024, a report to the public prosecutor's office is made on 27 February 2025 by Bruno Retailleau, then Minister of the Interior, a complaint of cyberbullying was filed by the French MP Prisca Thevenot following the events of 17 March 2025, and the hearings conducted by the BRDP on 2 and 3 April 2026 led to several criminal court dates. Several separate court hearings involving MEP Rima Hassan are announced in 2026, including one on 7 July and two further summonses on 16 September.

#### *A case that is changing in nature*

It is no longer so much a matter of public debate as of a judicial timetable that has become continuous.

#### 4. The ORPI sequence : the turning point

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One element marks a turning point in the case: the so-called 'ORPI' video.

On 27 June 2025, a video publicly exposing employees of a property agency belonging to the ORPI network (a network of estate agents in France) went viral on social media. Published by Rima Hassan, then a Member of the European Parliament, this video reached an audience of over 15 million views, giving it exceptional reach.

This broadcast took place against a backdrop of intense polarisation and online mobilisation. Given the available evidence, it may have contributed to making individuals identifiable in the digital public sphere, far beyond a limited circle.

In the hours and days following this broadcast, two ORPI agencies were the targets of arson attacks. Whilst no direct causal link can be legally established between the broadcast of the video and these acts, the temporal proximity between exposure on such a scale and the occurrence of these events constitutes a significant factor in the assessment of risk. Even in the absence of established legal causality, an institution may be expected to demonstrate its ability to assess a risk that has become apparent.

Ms Rima Hassan also stated that one of the images of the fire that was broadcast was a creation generated by artificial intelligence. Subsequently, the director of the ORPI network indicated that he had filed a complaint, notably regarding death threats.

A private security firm was also commissioned to provide surveillance of ORPI's head office premises, located in Clichy (Hauts-de-Seine, France).

In practical terms, identifiable individuals were exposed to a mass audience in a context that preceded violent acts occurring during the same period. This sequence of events does not establish legal causality. However, based on the information currently available to the public, it may be interpreted as indicating a concrete risk and as transforming the case into an institutional issue.

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**15 million views. Identifiable individuals exposed. Two cases of arson in the days that followed.**

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*From this point on, the European Parliament's inaction is no longer a mere possibility. It becomes a question with no answer.*

### **Supplementary visual material : dissemination channels and discursive register**

The following elements do not document external consequences comparable to those examined in the ORPI sequence. Instead, they allow us to observe, based on content published on Instagram, the channels used, the circulation of certain messages, and the nature of the register they employ.

The analysed content shows the use of Arabic audio tracks in certain Instagram stories by Rima Hassan, the content of which, once translated into French for the purposes of this analysis, reveals explicit wording.

### **Original post and medium used and initiale et support utilisé**

The screenshot shows Rima Hassan's official account, titled 'rimamobarak', and the music track 'Marcel Khalife · The Anthem (Nashid Al Intifa...)'.



*Screenshot illustrating the use of an Arabic audio track. Here, an apology for "ransom".*

### **Translation of the lyrics**

The analysis in this report provides a French translation of this content, including an article published in April 2025 which mentions the phrase 'we will pay a ransom'.

# Voici la traduction des paroles

Ô usurpateurs ! Espèces de renégats ! Ce sont nos  
coffres

أَيُّهَا الْغَاصِبُونَ أَيُّهَا الْمَارْقُونَ هِيَ ذِي صَدُورِنَا

Nous sommes le feu de la lutte Nous sommes le vent qui  
souffle Nous sommes la source du don La tolérance est  
précieuse Nous expirons le parfum Nous sommes la voix  
de la conscience Nous sommes des coups de tonnerre

Si la trompette sonne

نحن نأرُّ الكفاح نحن عصفُ الرياح نحنُ نبعُ العطاء إنَّ يِعزُّ السماح نحن  
نفحُ العبير نحن صوتُ الضمير نحن قصفُ الرُّعود إنَّ يدويُّ النفير

Pour une nouvelle aube, le désir de poussière Pour une  
aube nouvelle, nous ferons une rançon Pour une  
nouvelle aube, le désir de poussière Pour une aube  
nouvelle, nous ferons une rançon

*French translation proposed for the analysis : "For a new dawn, the desire for dust. For a  
new dawn, the desire for ransom."*

## Amplification and targetting in short-form content

An Instagram story posted by Rima Hassan in January 2025 paying musical tribute to Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas, as well as another story posted by the MEP in January 2025, the lyrics of which glorify the intifada, notably through the use of knives.



rimamobarak 2h

Watch Full Reel >

maestranv

202

Indestructible

**SINWAR a promis que vos  
maisons seraient restituées...**





*Short format screenshot published in January 2025.*

*Translation added as an overlay: "We ignited the intifada [...] with stones and knives"*

## **A pattern of dissemination and escalation in tone**

Introduction. This sequence allows us to observe a pattern of dissemination structured over time.

Sequence 1 - Initial dissemination. The sequence begins with a post associated with the track 'Marcel Khalife · The Anthem (Nashid Al Intifa...)'. The analysis provides a French translation, superimposed on the story.

Sequence 2 - Amplification. The analysed content shows that the use of Arabic audio tracks is part of a pattern of repeated dissemination, the meaning of which remains inaccessible to non-Arabic speakers.

Sequence 3 - Targeting. The sequence continues with shorter, more direct formats, notably content published in January 2025 paying tribute to Yahya Sinwar or outlining courses of action. The tone shifts towards direct appeal.

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This report no longer merely document facts. It documents the moment when an institution's silence itself becomes a fact.

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## **5. Consolidation of documented facts**

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The elements presented thus far allow the underlying dynamics of the case to be understood.

They now require a structured reading.

These incidents are not isolated. They fall into an identifiable category, based on the nature of the remarks, their repetition, their public reach, and the risks they raise. The four sections that follow do not have the same focus, but they all point in the same direction.

### **A. Legitimation of armed violence**

A first set of facts concerns the repeated legitimation of armed violence. Several public statements attributed to the MEP fall within this register.

On October 17, 2024, she stated that "armed resistance is legitimate and even indispensable."

These facts are not isolated. They form part of an identifiable typology, based on the nature of the statements, their repetition, their public reach,

and the risks they raise.

The following four analytical blocks do not concern the same object, but they point in the same direction.

## **B. Relativization of terrorist acts and radicalization of discourse**

A second set concerns the relativization of terrorist acts and a radicalization of discourse.

On August 22, 2024, the MEP refused to describe the October 7, 2023 attacks as terrorist acts.

On July 3, 2025, she wrote that "Zionism is a racist and colonial ideology."

On March 20, 2026, she stated that "hating Israel [...] is a sign of good mental and militant health."

These elements contribute to a polarization that raises questions regarding compatibility with the obligations of parliamentary office.

Taken individually, each statement could be framed as controversy. Taken together, they reveal a recurring polarization exceeding isolated incidents.

This is no longer simple criticism. It is a shift.

## **C. Passage from discourse to mobilization or targeting**

A third set of facts marks the transition from discursive expression to forms of mobilization, targeting, or exposure of third parties.

The ORPI sequence of June 27, 2025, the call to blockade Eurolinks in Marseille on September 10, 2025 (Eurolinks being identified as referenced in the file), and the call for a gathering at Charles de Gaulle Airport on October 2, 2025, as well as the events of March 17, 2025, all fall within this same logic of direct mobilization.

Taken individually, these episodes may appear heterogeneous. However, their succession reveals a common pattern: the transformation of discourse into a dynamic of mobilization or targeting.

This is no longer mere speech. These are effects.

## **D. Networks, support structures and ideological environment**

Finally, a last set of elements concerns support networks, relays, affiliations, and proximities that expand the analytical scope.

It documents what these relationships produce institutionally.

Tributes to Georges Ibrahim Abdallah, a Lebanese member of the PFLP terrorist organization, convicted in France in 1987 for complicity in the assassinations of an American diplomat and an Israeli diplomat.

Participation in the Maghreb-Mashreq Forum in Tunis, attended notably by representatives of Hamas, the PFLP, and Islamic Jihad.

Interactions with FEMYSO or ENAR, FEMYSO being a European Islamic youth organization cited in governmental reports as close to the Muslim Brotherhood movement.

These links are distinct but collectively form a coherent background.

Taken individually, these elements could be debated or nuanced. Taken together, they reveal a broader ideological and relational environment beyond the immediate circle.

This is no longer a simple entourage. It is an environment.

Taken individually, these points could be debated, qualified or challenged. Taken together, they form a coherent whole. It is this coherence that gives the case its particular strength and transforms a series of incidents or controversies into an institutional issue.

## **6. The collaborative environment : visual evidence**

The case shifts in nature again. The following elements concern Hicham Touili-Idrissi, parliamentary assistant to Rima Hassan.

Until now, the facts analyzed concerned a directly elected official. A new element now appears: her immediate environment.

This point is decisive. It is no longer only about positions, but about an ecosystem.

The European Parliament's silence now extends beyond the MEP herself and concerns an environment directly linked to her mandate.

These visuals are not mere illustrations. They must be read as evidentiary components.

One initial element helps to understand this dynamic :

### **First element : Publicly claimed affiliation**



## Hicham Touili-idrissi Il/Lui

Parlement Européen, Commission des Droits Humains

European Parliament · Sciences Po

Paris, Île-de-France, France

500 ou + relations

 [Se connecter](#)

 [Message](#)



### Infos

Photographer & filmmaker, Sciences Po graduate of Human Rights and Humanitarian Action passionate about arts as a means to amplify awareness and drive social change. Skilled researcher and public relations manager with over 3 years of experience in academic research and 7 years in public-facing roles.

*The image documents the explicit use of parliamentary status in the public sphere. Taken together with the rest of the corpus, it sheds light on how the immediate environment of the mandate is publicly claimed.*

A second element reinforces this interpretation:

**Second element : External legal proceedings**



LES PLUS LUS

**ABO** Boualem Sansal et Philippe de Villiers : au chevet de la France...

«Polyamour»  
propos d'un s

Publicité

INCA

Dépistage du cancer colorectal



**ABONNÉ** SOCIÉTÉ

# **INFO JDD. Le président de Sciences Po saisit la justice après des manifestations anti-Israël, un collaborateur de Rima Hassan visé**

Luis Vassy, fraîchement nommé à la tête de Sciences Po, fait face à des manifestations anti-Israël qui agitent l'institution. Il a saisi le procureur de la République, visant directement Hicham Touili-Idrissi, collaborateur de la députée européenne Rima Hassan et membre du comité Palestine.

Jules Torres

05/10/2024 à 07:00, Mis à jour le 05/10/2024 à 10:19

*The document reveals the existence of procedures external to the institution. Taken together with the other elements of the file, it helps to objectify its institutional scope.*

The logic is confirmed:

### Third element : Public call formulation



*The image shows that a call for an intifada has been made publicly. Placed within the overall chronology, it suggests a shift from an implicit register to a more directly mobilizing one.*

Finally, a sequence confirms this trend:

### Final element : Relay of content concerning terrorist organizations



*The content being shared presents Hamas, an organization classified as terrorist by the European Union, as a "political" actor. Taken in conjunction with the entire corpus, it exacerbates the potential tension with the European Union's normative framework.*

## 7. Expansion of the scope

The silence of the European Parliament therefore extends to a complete ecosystem falling within its institutional remit.

This shift modifies the institutional reading. The absence of reaction now concerns a structured set of elements, without any explicit doctrine defining its limits or treatment.

## A question of institutional consistency

*The following point answers this question precisely: before asking why the European Parliament remains silent here, it must be remembered that it has already shown, in another case, that it knows how to act quickly when it decides to do so.*

### 8. The European Parliament's capacity to act : The Grzegorz Braun's precedent

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Grzegorz Braun  
**POLISH MEP AS  
INSTITUTIONAL  
PRECEDENT**

Grzegorz Braun is a Polish MEP whose parliamentary immunity – that is, the protection afforded to elected representatives in the performance of their duties – was lifted in March 2026. The reasoning given by the European Parliament is key to understanding the case: the matters in question concerned public statements and matters of ordinary law deemed unrelated to the normal exercise of his mandate, and therefore separable from his parliamentary activity.

In other words, the European Parliament did not say that Braun was guilty on the merits. It stated that immunity should not prevent the national courts from examining matters considered to be outside the scope of parliamentary duties.

In this precedent, the Parliament's Committee on Legal Affairs, known as the JURI Committee, and the plenary session reiterate a consistent principle: immunity is not a personal privilege, but a functional guarantee intended to protect the independence of the European Parliament. Where a matter appears to be unrelated to the mandate, the institution may therefore allow national justice to take its course. The reasoning adopted is also clear: the European Parliament does not act as a substitute for the trial judge; it verifies whether the facts fall within the scope of

parliamentary activity and whether there is no *fumus persecutionis*, that is to say, no indication of politically motivated prosecution. In the Braun case, the institution's response is therefore clear to any reader: if the facts appear to lie outside the scope of the mandate, immunity may be waived to allow the national courts to proceed. Decisions TA-10-2026-0087 and TA-10-2026-0088 formally demonstrate this institutional capacity to take a stance. This precedent is not intended to compare individuals. It serves to gauge a capacity for action.

### Relevant legal and regulatory framework

- [Article 421-2-5 of the French Criminal Code](#)
- Protocol No 7 to the TFUE
- Directive (EU) 2017/541
- [Code of Conduct of the European Parliament](#)
- [Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament \(July 2024\)](#)

*This case shows that the European Parliament can take action when it chooses to do so.*

*Why does the European Parliament sometimes decide to act, and sometimes not ?*

## 9. The paradox demonstration

Two situations illustrate the issue:

This table does not compare two controversies. It does, however, compare two institutional responses.

Criteria	Grzegorz Braun case	Rima Hassan case
<b>Nature of facts</b>	Criminal-law-related acts and statements considered external to mandate	Public statements, controversies, and ongoing legal procedures
<b>Links to mandate</b>	Weak or nonexistent	Appears partially detachable

Criteria	Grzegorz Braun case	Rima Hassan case
<b>EU reaction</b>	Rapid and formal	No substantive reaction; minor reprimand on an accessory matter

In one case, the institution acts immediately. In the other, it does not react.

This highlights a difference in treatment.

*This disciplinary paradox goes beyond the scope of this case alone to call into question the overall doctrine of the institution.*

## 10. The threshold of reaction

The question then becomes: at what point does an institution decide to take action?

This is not a theoretical question. In this case, the threshold is no longer merely a matter of discourse: it becomes cumulative, procedural and institutional.

When public events recur, when they have visible effects on third parties, when they give rise to reports, hearings and summonses, and when a parliamentary precedent demonstrates that the institution has acted in other cases, the lack of a response ceases to appear as mere caution. It becomes, at the very least, a matter of principle.

At this stage, six elements have already been established

### **Repeated public acts**

The body of evidence is not based on an isolated incident, but on a pattern of conduct over time

### **Concrete consequences**

The ORPI sequence reveals a visible risk to identifiable third parties.

### **A judicial development**

The case has passed through several verifiable criminal

### **A mandate-related context**

The scope of the case no longer concerns just one elected representative, but also her

proceedings between 2024 and 2026.

immediate parliamentary environment.

### **An institutional precedent**

The Braun case demonstrates that the European Parliament can distinguish between facts detachable from the mandate and act accordingly.

### **An international signal**

Canada and Israel, two democratic allies of the European Union, have banned Rima Hassan from their territories. This discrepancy calls into question the European Union's normative credibility.

In the absence of an explicit threshold, there is therefore a risk of a response that varies from case to case, which is incomprehensible to the public and undermines the institution itself.

## **11. Why Europe is at stake**

The issue documented in this report goes beyond the individual case of a single elected representative. It concerns the governance of parliamentary staff and the European Parliament's ability to define what remains compatible with the requirements of prudence, exemplary conduct and accountability attached to a mandate protected by immunity.

If no clear doctrine specifies the compatibility between collaborative roles, external activism and repeated exposure to content glorifying violence, the risk is no longer merely reputational. It becomes organisational.

The report also highlights a further international signal: Canada and Israel, two democratic allies of the European Union, have banned Rima Hassan from their territories. Without prejudging the specific legal grounds of each of these states, such convergence carries significant political and symbolic weight. It means that, beyond the French context alone, democratic partners of the Union have deemed that the case warranted a protective measure or restriction serious enough to target access to their territory itself. For the European Union, the issue is not merely diplomatic. It concerns its normative credibility and its external image. When two allied states take measures of this nature against a serving MEP, whilst the

institution to which she belongs fails to formulate any clear doctrine on the substance of the matter, the discrepancy becomes apparent. It fuels the idea that the European Union struggles to define for itself the thresholds of compatibility between a parliamentary mandate, a political entourage and repeated exposure to serious incidents.

In the absence of clarification, this inaction risks setting a precedent of institutional tolerance far beyond the case under consideration here. This is where Europe is at stake.

The asymmetry with the Braun precedent fuels the perception of a disciplinary double standard depending on the case. If this asymmetry is neither explained nor corrected, it undermines the clarity of parliamentary doctrine far beyond the present case.

## **12. Strategic recommendations**

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The logic of the report does not call for a partisan stance. It calls for clear institutional clarification.

In this regard, several recommendations emerge from the report.

Publicly explain the criteria for triggering disciplinary procedures. The institution would benefit from specifying the facts, thresholds and procedures that render a disciplinary response necessary.

Establish a clear policy on parliamentary staff. The European Parliament should make explicit the principles governing the compatibility between staff roles, external activism and exposure to content legitimising violence.

Provide for a visible review when several active procedures coincide within the same period. Without prejudging the judicial outcome, the concentration of reports, hearings and summonses justifies, at the very least, a traceable institutional process.

Make public the rationale for distinguishing between the protection of the mandate and the protection of the MEP's environment. Otherwise, there is a risk of allowing the idea to take hold that immunity protects not only the exercise of a function, but also the ecosystem that extends it.

### 13. Conclusion

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Public facts, the judicial timetable, the ORPI sequence, the context of the mandate, the Braun precedent and the European scope now all point in the same direction.

The report does not impose a conclusion. It makes any other conclusion difficult. The decisive point is no longer the existence of matters to be examined. It raises the question of the doctrine applied by the European Parliament when public facts, ongoing proceedings and an institutional precedent are all present.

The final question is no longer whether there are grounds for action. It is to understand at what point inaction calls into question the institution's doctrine and becomes, in the eyes of the public, an institutional choice.

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**At what point does the European Parliament's silence become an institutional choice ?**

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### Documentary Annex and Traceability

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Reinstated Annex - Letter addressed to the President of the European Parliament:

The report reinstates as an annex the letter dated 26 August 2024 addressed to Roberta Metsola, President of the European Parliament. This document explains that the report specifically concerns Rima Hassan's participation, on 16 August 2024, in an anti-Semitic, pro-Hamas demonstration in Jordan paying tribute to Ismail Haniyeh. It constitutes an important piece of documentation for establishing the traceability of the political and institutional alert issued in the summer of 2024. View the letter :

Date	Documented event / Deadline
10 May 2024	Participation in the Maghreb-Mashreq Forum, a conference held in Tunis attended by representatives of Hamas, the PFLP and Islamic Jihad, amongst others.
26 August 2024	Following Rima Hassan's attendance at a pro-Hamas rally in Jordan in tribute to Ismail Haniyeh, a letter from French MPs was sent to Roberta Metsola; this document is included in the annex to this report. At the same time, Belgian MEP Assita Kanko calls for a parliamentary inquiry to be opened.
27 June 2025	ORPI sequence and tipping point for digital visibility.
24–26 March 2026	Decisions TA-10-2026-0087 and 0088 (Lifting of G. Braun's immunity).
27 March 2026	Canadian diplomatic expulsion, a measure taken by the Canadian authorities, forming part of a broader sequence of international territorial restrictions noted in the case file, also including Israel.
2–3 April 2026	Detention and questioning by the BRDP.
7 July 2026	Court hearing scheduled.
16 September 2026	Court summonses scheduled.

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## Summary of the proceedings

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To gain an overall understanding of the case, it is necessary to distinguish between public controversies and the procedural steps that have actually been taken. The timeline below illustrates this escalation.

Date	Procedural stage	Scope
30 April 2024	First summons to appear in Paris in proceedings based primarily on Article 421-2-5 of the Criminal Code	The case enters a definable judicial timeline for the first time
27 feb. 2025	Report to the public prosecutor's office by Bruno Retailleau following the statement that Hamas was carrying out a legitimate action	The case crosses a national threshold of political and criminal visibility.
17 April 2025	Voluntary interview by the BRDP, the investigative unit of the Paris judicial police	The handling of the case forms part of a formalised investigation procedure.
2 April 2026	Placed in police custody as part of an investigation by the National Unit for Combating Online Hate following a tweet quoting Kōzō Okamoto, a Japanese Red Army terrorist convicted of the Lod massacre in Israel in 1972	The case sees an unprecedented escalation of proceedings for a sitting MEP.
7 July 2026	Summons to stand trial for condoning terrorism, primarily on the basis of Article 421-2-5 of the Criminal Code	First substantive hearing on this charge: a decisive procedural threshold has been crossed.
16 sept. 2026	Two additional criminal summonses: public condoning of a crime or offence and public and direct incitement not followed by action to commit a crime or offence	The legal front is widening significantly and confirms the ongoing nature of the proceedings.

## Appendix on comparable Law : applicable

This includes a section on European and French comparative law designed to identify, in relation to the documented facts, the main legal frameworks that may be invoked. The table below follows this approach, distinguishing between French criminal law, European Union law and the institutional framework specific to the European Parliament.

It is not intended to prejudge a definitive classification for each incident. It provides a summary framework for understanding which legal provisions are likely to be invoked depending on the nature of the documented facts: glorification of terrorism, incitement, endangering third parties, mobilisation targeted, demanding environment and corporate responsibility.

Here is the second set formatted into a clear table:

Legal level	Applicable text	Main purpose	Relevance to the case
<b>France</b>	Article 421-2-5 of the Criminal Code	Prohibits direct incitement to acts of terrorism and the public glorification of such acts.	Forms the central national basis for the analysis of several public statements and for the ongoing criminal proceedings mentioned in the report.
<b>France</b>	Law of 29 July 1881 on freedom of the press	Organises the procedural and liability regime applicable to certain publications and public broadcasts, including online.	Complements the analysis where a documented fact relates to a public broadcast, an online message or a publication with a wide audience.

Legal level	Applicable text	Main purpose	Relevance to the case
<b>France</b>	Article 223-1 of the Criminal Code	Punishes the deliberate endangerment of others.	May provide insight, as a framework for interpretation, into sequences involving the exposure of identifiable third parties, particularly in the ORPI sequence.
<b>France</b>	Article 433-5 of the Criminal Code	Punishes certain forms of contempt or verbal abuse directed at persons holding public office.	May be used as a reference in the analysis of sequences targeting public officials, particularly those involving Prisca Thevenot.
<b>France</b>	Article L. 6341-4 of the Transport Code	Regulates offences against airport security.	Provides a framework for interpreting calls to action targeting Charles de Gaulle Airport and, more broadly, public order issues related to sensitive infrastructure.
<b>European Union</b>	Directive (EU) 2017/541 (Articles 5 and 16)	EU framework for combating terrorism, including public provocation and support for terrorist organisations.	Enables certain documented facts to be placed within the European regulatory framework relating to terrorism and symbolic or public

Legal level	Applicable text	Main purpose	Relevance to the case
			support for listed organisations
<b>European Union</b>	Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA	Combats certain forms of racism and xenophobia through criminal law.	Clarifies facts relating to public statements potentially conflicting with EU requirements on hate speech.
<b>European Union</b>	Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union	Defines EU foundational values: human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, fundamental rights.	Sets the normative benchmark for assessing any potential divergence between documented facts and EU principles.
<b>European Parliament</b>	Protocol No 7 on Privileges and Immunities (Articles 8–9)	Defines immunity regime for MEPs as functional protection linked to mandate.	Key framework for assessing whether acts fall within or outside parliamentary immunity.
<b>European Parliament</b>	Rules of Procedure (Articles 5, 6, 9, 176)	Governs immunity waivers, internal procedures, and disciplinary sanctions.	Allows assessment of Parliament’s institutional capacity to respond, even without a final conviction.
<b>European Parliament</b>	Code of Conduct (Articles 10–11)	Sets standards of dignity, integrity, and conduct for MEPs.	Ethical and disciplinary benchmark for evaluating compatibility of conduct with

Legal level	Applicable text	Main purpose	Relevance to the case
			parliamentary office.